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ABSTRACT 
Command, control, communicatiod and intelligence (C31) systems 
have become a necessity in future battlefield and warfare situations. 
Even though C2 to a large extent and C'I to some extent has been 
practised since the dawn of civilisation, it is only after the advent of 
microprocessors in the seventies, that c'I systems have started to 
take-off. However, it is basically, a reactive concept and can be made 
as effective as the user wants it to be. 
In this review, it is proposed to deal with three new aspects that 
will bring in substantial changes in them. These are information 
availability vs combat effectiveness, data fusion and application of 
artificial intelligence techniques. These aspects are outlined in this 
paper and their contribution to overall improved performance is 
brought out at the end. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Military operations in future whether limited warfare or strategic exchanges, are 
likely to be fought under conditions, the like of which have never been experience 
before. Advances in weapon systems and in electronics have added whole new 
dimensions to warfare by increasing the range, speed, accuracy and lethality of weapons 
whereby no area of any country is safe from a direct hit by the potential aggressor. 
This leads us to a situation where the need to be able to command and control the 
resources available to successfully fight the aggressor assumes greater importance. To 
achieve this purpose it is necessary to obtain intelligence that is, to gather information 
about the enemy, process it in real time for decision making and communicate them 
through a robust and effective communication network. The concept of integrating 
the elements of information gathering sensors, information processing computers and 
the back bone communication network to fulfil the objective of optimising the resources 
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has been termed c31 i.e., Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence. 
Though @I has been practiced as far back as the prehistoric man in his hunt for 
animal preys physically stronger than him, interest in this as a formal concept emerged 
in the nineteen seventies largely as a result of the advent of microprocessors. 
Unfortunately, due to the wide publicity that has been accorded to c31, it has 
come to be regarded as 'all things to all men' creating considerable confusion in the 
minds of a large section of people outside of the technical community dealing with 
these aspects. This confusion is further compounded by the fact that many 
manufacturers tend to brand virtually every new computer or communication 
equipment as a c31 'force multiplier.' It has to be noted that c31 is a reactive concept 
and can accomplish as much or as little as the user requires. of it. It primarily calls 
for the user to state clearly the requirements to be met, in particular a clear enunciation 
of the different threat scenarios that are likely to be faced. The system designer has 
to translate these into specifications for the sensors, the data fusion and processing 
capabilities, the communication network and the software that will enable the system 
to function as a fully distributed system. The subject of design is thus very 
interesting so it is proposed to review the impact of three new techniqueslaspects i.e., 
quantification of information availability in terms of combat effectiveness, data fusion 
and use of A1 techniques which will play very important part in enhancing the 
effectiveness of future c31 systems. 
2. INFORMATION FRAMEWORK ASPECTS 
We can consider a c31 system as a network of information sources and sinks 
which can exist together spatially or separated far apart. For example, the command 
centres can be considered as primarily information centres, i.e., a source-sink pair 
node, to which intelligence, reconnaissance, logistics, status information, weather etc 
flows in, while decision regarding deployment, weapon utilisation and additional 
intelligence needs flow out. These data range from voice in the case of minute to 
minute direction of tactical operations to authenticated recorded stored messages for 
large scale computer based information processing and display. These command 
centres have to be interconnected through switching centres and transmission links 
that move the informationlintelligence from one point to another. It can be easily 
inferred that without proper sensors and adequate processing capability, these centres 
can become focii of disinformation, confusion and decision making uncertainty. While 
it is physically impossible to reduce cuncertainties and delays to zero as this would 
call for infinite capacity and infinite time respectively, the designer has to work out 
a compromise between the time delay and degree of uncertainty acceptable so that 
the response to take action at the right place and in right amount is made possible. 
Hence one can view the C ~ I  system in the frame work of information using'EntropyV 
as the information measure for assessing effectiveness of information manipulation 
functions such as surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence, cover and deception, 
electronic warfare electronic security etc. 
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There have been attempts in recent times to quantitatively measure the influence 
of the amount of knowledge or information possessed by a combatant to combat 
effectiveness by representing this as an adjustment of the parameters in the differential 
equations that govern combat outcome. For this purpose one has to express 
mathematically the entropy or rate of change of entropy of important 
information-manipulative functions involved in C~I .  
One of the most commod information-manipulative functions is active search 
using a surveillance radar. In this case the exchange of information can be expressed as, 
p = -ap (1) 
wherep is the entropy (ignorance of the friendly forces) and a is the positive constant, 
p = dp/dt = rate of change in entropy. 
The increase in knowledge, that is gained in this case is dependent on the state of 
knowledge already possessed about a given situation. In other words the more we 
have to know (or the less we have to know) the more there is to gain (or the less 
there is to gain) by active search, collection and exchange of information about the 
situation among the concerned and cooperating combatant groups. 
On the other hand in the case of such information manipulative functions as 
cover and deception (covert collection) the increase gained in our knowledge of the 
situation is directly proportional to our current knowledge and enemy's current 
ignorance. The more knowledgeable we are and the more ignorant the enemy is, of 
the current situation, the more effective we will be in our covert attempts to collect 
information on enemy's communications, radar emissions, patterns of behaviour etc. 
This can be expressed as, 
P = -b(l-p)q (2) 
where q is entropy of enemy of current situation and b is a positive constant. 
In the case of electronic warfare, the information manipulation action results in 
interfering and inhibiting enemy's information collection activities. The purpose is to 
deceive, confuse and degrade enemy's knowledge of the situation. Therefore in this 
case, the more we know about the situation the more effective we can be to manipulate 
and thwart enemy's attempts at information collection. The more the enemy knows 
about the current situation, the more he has to lose if we are successful in our attempts 
to denytdeceive him of the knowledge about the situation. We can express this 
relationship mathematically as, 
9 = c (1-P ) (1-q (3) 
q = dq/dt, where dq/dt is the rate of change of entropy of enemy forces and c 
a positive constant. 
The significance of the evanescencettransitoriness of the information possessed by the 
combatant is an important factor in future battle situations for both combatants. 
Hence they have to employ as many means or methods (build in redundancies) to 
gather information about situation of the other and deny own situation information 
to the other. Therefore, even when no information manipulation activity such as the 
ones described above take place, the information state alters. Without an active effort 
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at collecting information evolving the situation, the state of knowledge will thus 
degrade. This can be expressed mathematically as, 
P = d (1-PI (4) 
where d is a positive constant. 
Equations (1) to (4) bring home to us the significance of the sensors as information 
gathering sources in the design of the c31 system ds these equations model information 
warfare (information exchange or denial between two combatants) as a time varying 
process. Neither of the combatants involved in this process can maintain his information 
advantage indefinitely. 
These equations enable us to work out the various operational and design measures 
to minimise enemy's effectiveness while improving our own capabilities without 
employing the sensors at cross purposes. For example, the use and scheduling of 
communication and active surveillance emissions in a staggered fashion in time, space 
and frequency domains in an unpredictable manner can make the job of the enemy 
in collecting information difficult as he will not be able to discern a specific pattern 
out of this. In a similar fashion if we design our communication and surveillance 
emissions to havelow probability intercept with minimum detectable energy over any 
given frequency band, then these robust systems cannot be easily overcome by enemy 
countermeasures. 
Since the amount of knowledge or information possessed by a combatant 
influences his combat effectiveness attempts have been made in this direction to evolve 
a mathematical model. For example, in the case of the ground battle, one can analyse 
it as made up of two basic elements, namely maneuver and fire. (a) Maneuver is 
intended to move towards the enemy in order to force him out of his pattern of 
advance. (b) Fire is intended to support the maneuver by paralysing the enemy even 
temporarily, until our own forces can gain an advantage and destroy the enemy. If 
one has perfect knowledge or all the information about the enemy then it is possible 
to co?centrate our fire power more effectively. Thus information can be linked to 
combat by relating, say, perfect knowledge of one's enemy as equivalent to the 
effectiveness obtained in aimed fire and complete igmrance as equivalent to the 
effectiveness obtained in area fire. A beginning has been made in this direction, but 
more research needs to be carried out with respect to the best means of modelling 
the coupling of the state of information to combat effectiveness, so that optimum 
fielding and utilisation of the sensors and the EW systems can be realised. 
3. DATA FUSION ASPECTS 
The successful utilisation of intelligencelinformation is dependent on three key 
factors and that is, sensors, data correlation-fusion and dissemination of the processed 
information. The sensors used in a C ~ I  system can be radars, ESM systems, infra-red, 
low light TV, electro optical systems or even human beings. All of them have diverse 
ranges upto which information/intelligence can be gleaned, different data rates at 
which the information can be gathered, various accuracies by which the target 
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parameters can be obtained, different gradations and probabilities for target detection, 
recognition and identification, different policies for operation and different spectral 
coverages as well as different spatial volumes to be searched. If the sensors are 
colocated then the intelligence processing and fusion leading to target recognition and 
identification becomes an easy task. In case the sensors are not colocated, then the 
raw data from the sensors has to be processed at the sensor site up to target detection 
level and then has to be transmitted to a common processor for correlation and fusion 
with other reports. 
The advantages of information fusion include lower false.alarm rates, reduced 
ambiguities, robust operational performance, extended spatial and temporal coverage, 
increased confidence, improved detection, enhanced spatial resolution and system 
reliability and overall improved system performance. Hoever, there are numerous 
difficulties inherent in this task. Some of these are diminishing signatures of targets, 
passive operation by the enemy to acquire the data of interest through communication 
nets, programming of weapon systems to emit for minimum possible time, agility of 
the threats in several parameters that uniquely characterise the threats etc. All these 
result in greater difficulties for correlation and tracking and thus create gaps in our 
understanding of the situation. O n  our part there is a need to use data from other 
sources for fusion to improve the tracking and identification of targets. These sources 
external to the sensors include our military plans and orders of battle, intelligence 
data on enemy's plans and orders of battle obtained by prisoner interrogation, Comint 
or other means etc. The architectures of data fusion vary greatly over the wide range 
of missaion for which C ~ I  is made use of but there are certain common functions 
which are embedded in all of them. These are, data association and tracking, data 
combination and classifications. 
3.1 Data association and tracking 
Data association is the process which correlates new data or information (targets, 
reports or tracks) with other bits of information already resident in the data base. 
Correlation can be among multiple reports in time (sequential sampling) or multiple 
reports in space (different views from distributed sensors) or both. Any algorithm 
evolved for data association has to take into consideration the possibility of 
measurements occuring at different points in time and in space as well as varying 
accuracies of the sensors and the sensor data being available in differing coordinate 
systems. The association techniques have been broadly classified into report-to-report, 
report-to-track and track-to-track categories. In the case of report-to-report technique, 
a correlation gate or a distance measure is used to accept or reject the hypothesis. If 
there is a difference in time between the reports then the target motion can be used 
to adjust the gate criteria and this fact can lead us straight away to discriminate 
between moving threats and stationary/slow moving targets. Report-to-report motion 
gives best results when the sensor measuring accuracies are very much high as compared 
to the target velocities and the target is following a specific trajectory. The sequential 
time samples of the threat can be utilised to develop the kinematic model so that the 
correlation performance is enhanced. For report-track and track-to-track association, 
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all possible pairs of (new data-existing data) assignments are formed with each pair 
being a tentative assignment. Each of these hypotehsis (pairing) is evaluated by 
computing the probability or likelihood of this pairing being true, the criteria being 
a specified distance measure in the correlation space. For multiple sensor data sets 
or time-sequential data, with each new data there can be a combinatorial explosion 
unless the data sets are reduced. This can be accomplished by clustering the passible 
hypotheses into multiple tracks or by pruning those data pairs which do not achieve 
a preassigned lower values of the score. Many mathematical models have been 
developed over the years to estimate and predict the kinematic behaviour, the more 
well known being the alpha-beta filter and the Kalman filter. 
3.2 Data combination and classifications 
Data combination is the numerical process which uses the multiple sensor 
measurements to classify the threat into one or more specified categories. Several 
numerical methods of representing and combining evidence have been evolved over 
the years and these have been broadly categorised as hard decision or soft decision 
approaches. In the hard decision approach, it combines declarations of single sensors 
by such logical rules as majority voting or weighted summation. These hard decision 
rules work very well when the number of sensors are small in numbers and can be 
implemented as a loop up table of decisions, one for each possible combination of 
sensor reports. In the case of soft decisions the quantitative measure of evidence is 
used for a probabilistic or a possibilistic approach to solve the issue. The classical 
probabilistic approach uses the Bayesian criterion combining the a pnon probabilities 
into a posterior probability for decision making. Possibilistic (fuzzy set) approach 
attempts represent not only the value of the evidence but also a measure of the 
ignorance (uncertainty) associated with the measurement. In both these approaches, 
numerical values representing a degree of belief in the candidate category models or 
hypotheses are brought out and decision rules are applied to the posterior probabilities 
to assign threat categories. In practice, soft decision approaches ofer a significant 
benefit due to integration of all the available information provided by the sensors. 
They can therefore provide an earlier, longer-range decision because of this. 
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determine the data necessary to task the sensors. This could include pointing data for 
electro-optical sensors, tuning data for ESM systems, or statistics for computer driven 
receivers. The final operation in this sequence takes sensor reports, compares then) 
against the current situation model, updates it on the basis of the new information 
which could result in a new threat being reported or elimination of an earlier false 
alarm or disambiguation of an earlier report or a stronger belief in the presence of 
threat already predicted by the model. 
In this case the knowledge base that is needed, will include the models of behaviour 
of threat systems, their interactions with each other, their capabilities, tactics, doctrine 
and operating procedures. The behaviour model of the threat systems will depict 
allowable states, the new states that each state could transition to, the condition for 
making that transition and any observables associated with the state. The knowledge 
base should also contain the environmental aspects such as terrain constraints on 
mobility, sitting, atmospheric effects on sensors, etc. The combination of information 
in the knowledge based systems occurs in a non-Bayesian manner in that it encodes 
ignorance explicitly, thereby enabling us to distinguish between ignorance and 
disbelief. This is very crucial in determining, for example, whether a small likelihood 
associated with a threat system is due to our having looked at and disregarded it 
(disbelief) or due to our not having looked but not having any strong reason to believe 
that it is there (ignorance). The A1 approach to inference is superior to the conventional 
approach in that it can access other sources of data to verify a threat or to eliminate 
most false alarms or to resolve ambiguities by tasking sensors to acquire specific data 
that is needed. The A1 approach leads to graceful degradation as environmental 
conditions worsen, due to its inherent ability to supplement poor information from 
one source with information from other sources. 
The role of data fusion in c31 systems is a critical one and the introduction of 
multi role sensors as well as the use of A1 techniques in threat inferencing holds out 
a promise of much better system performance as all available data is most effec- 
tively used. Data fusion thus provides the human commander with accurate and timely 
information which has the highest possible degree of certainty. 
4. A1 AND C% SYSTEMS 
The likely advantages of using A1 techniques in data fusion gives us an opportunity 
to examine whether this can be employed in other areas of c31 systems. The large 
scale use of computers in future C ~ I  systems will result in increased traffic flow between 
the different nodes which goes against the requirement that the system should operate 
with least degradation in the face of intense and extensive Electronic Warfare(EW) 
in the 1990s. There is thus a need to explore techniques that will bring in significant 
reductions in the amount of information that must be transferred. The present 
computer languages and protocols for communications, because of the restrictive use 
of meanings for symbols and words result in a longer string of characters representing 
the same information or query than is required with a more natural language. Further, 
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all the necessary steps including data retrieval and processing need to be explicitly 
spelt out in the data request. On the other hand if a more natural language were to 
be used, only the desired information need be requested without requiring to spell 
out all the intervening steps. Attempts are on hand at a large number of research 
institutions to develop natural language processors which will accept queries, 
commands, statements or data in natural language with all the ambiguities associated 
with them and convert them into necessary steps, data searches, manipulations and 
inferences in the more formal language of the computer to obtain the desired 
information. Of course in this case the natural language processor will have to possess 
the knowledge of the subject matter if it has to resolve correctly the abmiguities in 
the queries, or data presented to it in natural language. Preliminary studies camed 
out in USA indicate that there can be a ten to one reduction in the characters required 
to be exchanged between computers to express an information request. It is possible 
to abbreviate the normal language queries still further through various standard data 
compression codes and table look-up techniques. To realise these savings in 
communication traffic, in a distributed data-base system, multiple language processors 
front-end each data base so that the natural language queries received from a distant 
point can be interpreted. It also requires a natural language processor back-ending 
the user terminal to help determine which data base system to send the data request 
to. While we would be considerably reducing the data traffic between nodes, the 
computational burden at each node is substantially enhanced as natural language 
processing is computationally intensive. The additional computational capability will 
further help in resolving ambiguities, error and conflicts in the received data at each 
node by means of previous background knowledge and inferencing mechanisms which 
are used to check logical consistency in the received data. This ability increases the 
robustnesdbf the system and enhances the tolerance to communication errors. The 
added computational burden at the nodes will certainly be worth the savings gained 
in network bandwidth and enhancement in security. 
Another area where A1 will improve the performance of C ~ I  systems is in reducing 
communication overheads for updating data bases in the distributed data-base 
configuration. If large knowledge bases are created at each node and if these are 
oriented around the various objects of interest, then each object oriented frame in 
the knowledge base can contain sensor measurements, features, parameters, location, 
information reflecting the rules of behaviour of the object, its default parameters etc. 
Further, many observed actions of the object, trigger associated events and actions 
in other targets. These interlinkages are reflected by imbedded procedures which is 
stored in the information frame associated with that object. It would get activated by 
the appropriate values and data updates so that past observations are combined with 
these procedures, default values and rules to infer likely future activities and motions. 
New observations will not be used for updating unless they tend to modify or contradict 
the existing knowledge base. Hence updates need only reflect significant changes and 
not information that can be inferred from the existing knowledge-base. In this case 
we trade-off communication bandwidth for memory overheads. By additing 
memory-dependent data such as past observed patterns and object inter dependencies, 
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the processing overhead for drawing inferences and making predictions based on this 
data is increased but the frequency of updating is reduced. In an extremely hostile 
environment where intense EW measures are employed by the enemy, the updates 
are likely to be noisy and reliable but this would not affect the performance of the 
system as we have memory dependent data. 
5. SUMMARY 
The increasing advances in sensor technologies and the steep fall in the prices of 
processors coupled with better and systematic evolution of software will bring in a 
number of significant changes in future c31 systems. The trend to find out ways and 
means of estimating the quantitative relationship between information availability and 
combat effectiveness will continue, to obtain an edge over the adversary in overall 
c31 system performance by optimum deployment of the sensors and EW systems. 
The use of multiple sensors will become more Common thereby requiring data fusion 
to lead to target identification. Artificial Intelligence techniques will find increasing 
use in data fusion, natural language processing to reduce communication traffic and 
achieve robust performance in the presence of hostile environment. 
